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Though the Kyoto Protocol concerns six greenhouse gases, most appraisals in the past have 
focused exclusively on CO2. But it is now acknowledged that, at least for some countries, there is 
an important potential of abating non-CO2 greenhouse gases with a relatively low cost. It is then 
the topic of the paper to present a multi-gas assessment of the Kyoto Protocol and to compare the 
results with the single CO2 case. 
The assessment is done with GEMINI-E3, a world General Equilibrium Model. The first part of 
the paper describes the database and the methodology implemented in order to model non-CO2 
greenhouse gases. The second part presents the results of the standard No Trade Kyoto scenario, 
with a single CO2 or a multi-gas strategy. Taking into account the potential of abatement of non-
CO2 greenhouse gases greatly reduces the cost of committing to the Kyoto Protocol, but exhibits 
significant differences between countries according to the importance of the corresponding 
emissions in the initial situation. 
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Introduction 
The Kyoto Protocol contemplates several flexibility mechanisms, namely tradable permits, 
clean development mechanism and joint implementation, but also takes into consideration six 
greenhouse gases. Optimization among these various degrees of liberty allow to reduce the cost 
of committing to targets by Annex B countries and this has been extensively demonstrated by all 
the studies and assessments implemented up to now. 
However, most of these studies (see in particular the special issue of The Energy Journal, 
May 1999) have focused on a single GHG, which is effectively the most important in terms of 
weighted emissions, but also the best known and easiest to model as it is directly linked to fossil 
energy consumption. Obviously the contribution of other GHG may only be positive because the 
cost of abatement is usually very small in the first stages of emissions reduction, and allocating 
optimally the targets of abatement between the six gases may yield a welfare gain, compared to a 
single CO2 strategy. The question is the importance of this potential gain and whether the gain is 
transitory or permanent. 
Some recent work has been devoted to the topic (see references in bibliography) but not yet 
systematized as in the case of CO2. The issue has been considered important enough by the 
Energy Modeling Forum to create a specific working group in order to cope with it. Curves of 
abatement cost have been established by EMF for the five other GHGs, and the task of WG 21 is 
to assess, through several CGE models, the effects of their incorporation in the abatement 
strategy of the various Annex B countries. 
The present paper
1 yields the results obtained with the modeling team of GEMINI-E3, 
which is participant to WG 21. Section I describes the methodology implemented, section II the 
reference (Business as Usual) case. Section III presents the results of the scenarios, the definition 
of which was decided in the working group, and section IV analytical scenarios aimed at 
explaining the main factors at work. 
Main teachings are drawn in the conclusion, and possible further work considered. 
I. Methodology Implemented in GEMINI-E3 
I.1 The model GEMINI-E3 
GEMINI-E3 was the name of the first General Equilibrium Model developed jointly by the 
French Ministry of Equipment and CEA (French Atomic Energy Agency). It is now the name of 
a family of models, including GEMINI-E3/GemWTraP, which is a world dynamic semi-
aggregate model, and GEMINI-E3/XL France, which is a static detailed one-country model 
(France, 88 sectors). 
GEMINI-E3/GemWTraP is a multi-country,  multi-sector,  dynamic General Equilibrium 
Model incorporating a highly detailed representation of indirect taxation. For some purposes, 
namely appraisal of energy policies directly involving the electric sector, e.g., implementation of 
nuclear programs, the model can incorporate a technological sub-model of power generation 
                                                 
1 Special thanks are due to EMF and in particular to John Weyant and Francisco Delachasnay for having made 
available to all participants a precious database concerning the non CO2 greenhouse gases.   3
better suited for comparing investments in different types of plants. It is the third version in 
succession and has been especially designed to calculate the social marginal abatement costs 
(MAC), i. e. the welfare loss of a unit increase in pollution abatement, and then to simulate 
tradable permits markets based either on market prices (carbon tax) or on social marginal costs. 
Trade of permits based on MACs corresponds to the optimization behavior by countries in 
taxation and environmental policy implementation, and is in most cases more efficient than trade 
of permits based on market prices or equivalents
2. 
 
Table 1: Identification card of GEMINI-E3/GemWTraP 
Full Name : General Equilibrium Model of International-National-Interaction for Economy-Energy-
Environment/General equilibrium model for assessment of World Tradable Permits 
 
7 zones : France, Other European Countries (EU11), USA, Japan, Former Soviet Union (FSU), Energy Exporting 
Countries (EEC), Rest of the World (ROW) 
 
3 Institutional Sector (IS) : Households (Incl. Private Administration), Firms, Government 
 
12 sectors/commodities for France and EU11; 8 for USA, Japan, FSU, EEC and ROW (5 of which for Energy : 
coal, gas, electricity, crude oil, refined oil products) 
 
Starting Year : 1990 
 
Terminal Year : 2040 (with yearly steps) 
 
Productions Functions : Nested CES with fix factors for fossil fuel sectors 
 
Households’ Demand Function : Linear Expenditure System (Stone-Geary model) 
 
Function of Imports : Nested with domestic production (consistent with Armington assumption) 
 
Indirect taxation and social contributions : 13 categories with rates differentiated : 
  - by commodity (taxes on production, on imports) 
  - by sector (social contributions, subsidies) 
  - by sector x commodity (intermediate consumption) 
  - by commodity x institutional sector (final demand) 
  - by commodity x sector x IS (investment) 
 
Linkage of periods : with endogenous real rates of interest (determined by equilibrium between savings and 
investment) 
 
Linkage of national/regional models : with endogenous real exchange rates (resulting from constraints on foreign 
trade deficits or surpluses) 
 
Outputs : by country, annually : 
  - carbon taxes, marginal abatement cost and price of tradable permits when relevant 
  - effective abatement of CO2 emissions, net sales of tradable permits (when relevant) 
  - total net welfare loss and components : net loss from terms of trade, pure deadweight loss of 
taxation, net purchases of tradable permits (when relevant) 
  - macro-economic aggregates : production, imports and final demand (change in volume and change 
in price); real exchange rates and real interest rates 
  - industry data : production and factors of production (change in volume and change in price or 
remuneration) 
                                                 
2 See Bernard (1999) and Bernard and Vielle (2003).   4
Table 1 above gives an overall description and the main characteristics of the model. 
Beside a comprehensive description of indirect taxation (mainly for France), the specificity of the 
model is to simulate all relevant markets: markets for commodities (through relative prices), for 
labor (through wages), for domestic and international savings (through rates of interest and 
exchange rates). Terms of trade, i.e. transfers of real income between countries resulting from 
variations of relative prices of imports and exports, and then “real” exchange rates, can then be 
precisely measured
3. 
The specification of production functions 
Figure 1 represents the nesting of factors in production functions, for all sectors and all 
countries or regions. Important parameters are the various elasticities of substitution, between 
imports and domestic production, between aggregate domestic factors (capital, labor, energy, 
other inputs), and for the two last nests, between individual fuels and between commodities. 
 
Figure 1 
Nesting of factors in the production function (example of France) 
Distributed Production
CES
Imports       Domestic Production
   CES        CES
Imports   Imports …   Imports
from EU11 from USA … from ROW
Crude Oil   Fix Factor
        (only for refined oil products sector)            (only for fossil fuel sectors)
Other Inputs
Labor Energy Capital       Other Inputs
 CES CES
   Electricity Fossil Fuel
Gas Coal Refined Petroleum
   products
Agriculture    Energy Equipment   Consumer   Transport   Services        Non
         Intensive Goods   Goods      Goods              Market
       Services
 
                                                 
3 The real exchange rate between two countries is the relative price of the numéraires chosen in each country (and 
usually based on a basket of goods representative of GDP). It is not identical to the monetary exchange rate of the 
currencies of the two countries: in particular, the real exchange rate can evolve between countries belonging to a 
same monetary union.   5
Allowing more or less easy substitution between factors, they command much of the 
numerical results in scenarios: abatement of CO2 emissions with a given carbon tax, and then cost 
of abatement; substitution of domestic factors to imports and then terms of trade, and so on. The 
values of elasticity of substitution employed in the model were determined according to various 
sources and econometric estimations. 
Cost of pollution abatement: measurement and factors 
Cost of abatement policies, in the various possible ways of implementation, is a key 
indicator of the efficiency of climate change policies. Effectively, when there exists a perfect 
substitute to the polluting good, or a de-polluting device, the additional cost of the good or of the 
device measures the welfare cost of abatement. In the case of greenhouse effect, this is rarely 
possible, and the bulk of abatement results from refraining from consuming polluting goods, and 
from replacing them by other goods and factors, through taxation and changes in relative prices. 
Measuring welfare cost is more complex, and in particular macro-economic aggregates such as 
GDP or Households’ Final Consumption (HFC) are not relevant because they are calculated at 
constant prices, ignoring the welfare effects of changes in the structure of prices. 
The only consistent measure of welfare cost is households’ surplus, which can be based 
either on the Compensative Variation of Income (CVI) or on the Equivalent Variation of Income 
(EVI). Though theoretically slightly different, they yield very close results as the change in the 
structure of prices is limited (and energy is a small share in average production cost of the 
economy, as well as in households’ budget). Deriving demand by households from a utility 
function then allows to have a direct economic measure of the welfare cost of abatement policies. 
Households’ surpluses may be directly reckoned from the output of scenarios, for every year and 
every country/region, and they can be aggregated in various ways: either weighted by exchange 
rates and summed for a given year or period; or discounted through interest rates for a given 
country and then measuring the total discounted cost of the abatement policy. 
For a given period, households’ surplus is representative of the total welfare gain if the 
other elements of final demand (except exports) are held constant. This is the case of the final 
demand of government, which is exogenous in the model as in most general equilibrium models. 
Concerning productive investment, which is endogenous in the model and is sensitive to change 
in relative prices (and in particular to change in the relative price of consumption and capital 
goods), surpluses calculated annually are representative of welfare cost if its total investment -
 but not of course its allocation between sectors - is constrained to be constant in the scenario. 
Such a constraint has effectively been retained in the model
4. 
In a closed economy, households’ surplus reflects the pure substitution effect of taxation, i. 
e. the Deadweight Loss (DWL). In an open economy, income effects are added to the pure 
substitution effect, and they are channeled through the change in the relative prices of foreign 
trade. Corresponding gains or losses from “terms of trade”, as they are known in the specialized 
literature, may be an important and in some cases a dominant part of the total welfare gain or loss 
for a given country (though of course, they represent transfers and consolidate at the world level). 
                                                 
4 Retaining such a constraint is not necessary. It is possible to implement a simulation in two steps: first without 
constraint, to assess the effects on productive investment; secondly, at constant total investment, to measure welfare 
loss. In fact, experience shows that the effect of climate change policies on the allocation of GDP between final 
consumption and investment is very small.   6
Table 2 below recapitulates the “algebra” of welfare measurement in the case of an open 
economy, as described just above. 
 
Table 2 : Algebra of Welfare Measurement 
   
 S  =  ∆R  -   CVI 
  (Total Welfare Gain)    (Variation of Income)           (Compensating Variation of Income) 
 
   = -DWL  +   G 
      (Deadweight Loss of Taxation)                  (Gains from Terms of Trade) 
 
 G  =  ΣEXP ∆PEXP  -   ΣIMP ∆PIMP 
 
   ≅  ΣPIMP ∆IMP  -   ΣPEXP ∆EXP 
 
Total welfare gain and gains from terms of trade can be computed directly from the 
numerical detailed results of scenarios: formulas above then determine by difference the 
deadweight loss of taxation, which represents the pure substitution effect of domestic pollution 
abatement
5. 
Definition of the marginal abatement cost may appear obvious, but its precise 
determination is more complex. According to theoretical analysis
6, what is relevant for exchange 
in a market of tradable permits is the marginal abatement cost defined as the welfare loss at 
constant prices of foreign trade. On the other hand, this welfare loss is to be deflated by the 
social value of goods, since the permit is exchanged against tradable goods. Social values
7 of 
goods differ from market prices of a quantity which is equal to the marginal cost of public funds 
(MCPF). 
Calculating marginal abatement costs at constant prices of foreign trade
8 would normally 
require to operate separately for each country and for each period. However, it is possible to 
operate globally, and to eliminate the effects of change in the relative prices of foreign trade by 
subtracting to marginal surplus the marginal gain or loss from terms of trade. In other terms, the 











I.2. Non CO2 Greenhouse Gas Emissions 
For non CO2 GHG, all the data (emissions and abatement curves) come from the EMF21 
Working Group
9 on Multi-Gas Mitigation and Climate Change. 
                                                 
5 In case of tradable permits, corresponding sales or purchases must be taken into account. 
6 See Bernard (1999). 
7 They are determined by measuring the welfare gain of a unit additional resource of the given good. 
8 This is also the case for the MCPF. 
9 See for information on the Energy Modeling Forum : http://www.stanford.edu/group/EMF/home/index.htm   7
Methane 
We take into account 12 sources of CH4 emissions on the basis of EMF21 database. The 
emissions of each source are linked to an activity level (or an economic driver) the coefficient of 
which is calibrated on the baseline scenario: for example if 
E CH 2010 4  is the level of CH4 emitted 





2010 2010 4 XD A CH
E CH E × =  
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For the other years we interpolate the coefficient between the reference years (1990, 1995, 
2000, 2005, 2010). 
The table below shows the correspondence between the sources and the sectors/products in 
GEMINI-E3, the variable of the model representing the level of emissions, and whether an 
abatement curve is available. 
Table 3 : Methane and GEMINI-E3 Activities 
Source Economic  Drivers  Sector/Product  MAC 
Biofuel Combustion  Households’ consumption  Other goods & services   
Biomass Burning  Households’ consumption  Other goods & services   
Coal Production  Coal  Yes 
Enteric Fermentation  Production  Agriculture   
Fuel Stat & Mobile  Domestic Consumption  Refined Oil   
Manure Production  Agriculture  Yes 
Natural Gas  Domestic Consumption  Natural Gas  Yes 
Oil Production  Refined  Oil  Yes 
Rice Production  Agriculture   
Solid Waste  Households’ consumption  Other goods & services  Yes 
Wastewater  Households’ consumption  Other goods & services   
Other  Household consumption  Other goods & services   
Nitrous Oxide 
For N2O emissions we adopt the same formulation and the following table gives the economic 
drivers for the 9 sources of emission. 
Table 4 : Nitrous Oxide and GEMIN-E3 Activities 
Source Economic  Drivers  Sector/Product  MAC 
Agri. Soil Management  Production  Agriculture   
Other Agri. Sources  Production  Agriculture   
Biomass Fuel  Households’ consumption  Other goods & services   
Fossil Fuel  Fossil Fuel Consumption  Coal, Refined Oil and Gas   
Manure Production  Agriculture   
Other Non Agri.  Households’ consumption  Other goods & services   
Adipic Acid  Production  Energy Intensive Industry  Yes 
Nitric Acid  Production  Energy Intensive Industry  Yes 
Human Sewage  Households’ consumption  Other goods & services   
   8
Fluorinated Gases 
We distinguish four types of fluorinated gases : PFCs, SF6, HFC-23, other HFCs. 
PFCs include all high-GWP gases emitted from aluminium and semiconductor manufacture, 
including CF4, C2F6, and C3F8. SF6 include all high-GWP emissions from the production and 
processing of magnesium and from use of electrical equipment. HFC-23 represents all high-GWP 
emission from the production of HCFC-22. Other HFCs include all high-GWP gases emitted 
during their use as substitutes for ozone-depleting substances, including emissions from air 
conditioning and refrigeration equipment, foams, solvents, MDI and non MDI aerosol, and fire 
extinguishing equipment. This includes primarily HFCs with lifetimes under 100 years. 
 
Table 5 : Fluorinated Gases and GEMIN-E3 Activities 
Source Economic  Drivers  Sector/Product  MAC 
PFCs  Households’ consumption  Other goods & services  Yes 
SF6  Households’ consumption  Other goods & services  Yes 
HFC-23  Households’ consumption  Other goods & services  Yes 
Other HFCs  Households’ consumption  Other goods & services  Yes 
I.3.Curve of abatement 
Abatement is computed on the basis of the EMF21 abatement curves. These curves have 
the generic form described below: 
 





We can then compute the level of CH4 emissions from tax (the carbon tax at constant 
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I.4. Cost of abatement and tax receipts 




i × × × , where F(tax) is the integral 
of the function 
1 − f  in the interval [0, ) (tax f ] 
In order to avoid non-constant returns to scale in production functions, we suppose 
that the operational cost of abatement is borne by the Government (and consists of consumption 
in commodity 08). Government consumption is then the sum of two terms: a “final” good, which 
is representative of various services for the economy and in particular for households; an 




i × × × . This 
distinction is important for GEMINI-E3 because, in order to get relevant yearly measures of 
welfare cost, we implement the climate change scenarios at constant final demand (except 
obviously households’ final consumption and imports, and in particular at constant Government 
“final” consumption and constant total investment
10). 
Taxes on non CO2 emissions are paid by the concerned sectors and accrue to the 
Government receipts. The tax is a charge for firms and, according to the working of the model, it 
is incorporated in the production cost and then in the production price. 
II. Reference Case 
II.1. Macro-economic trends and GHG emissions 
The baseline scenario of GEMINI-E3 is mainly calibrated on IEO 2002, build by the US 
Energy Information Administration and published in March 2002. The following tables give for 
the 7 countries/regions of GEMINI-E3 the rates of growth of GDP, energy consumption and 
fossil fuel CO2 emissions, and the detailed GHG emissions in MMTCE. 
 
Table 6 :Baseline Scenario: Macro-economic Data 
(annual average growth in %) 
Country/Region GDP  Energy 
Consumption 
Fossil fuels CO2 
Emission  
  2000-2010 2010-2020 2000-2010 2010-2020 2000-2010 2010-2020 
France  2.5 2.3 1.1 1.6 0.7 1.4 
EU11  2.4 2.4 1.2 1.3 0.8 0.9 
USA  3.0 3.0 1.7 1.7 1.6 1.6 
Japan  1.8 2.4 0.9 1.4 0.7 1.2 
Former  Soviet  Union  4.7 4.7 1.9 1.9 1.6 1.5 
Energy Exporting Countries  4.0  4.5  2.8  3.3  2.7  3.3 
Rest of the World  4.6  4.9  3.4  3.9  2.7  2.8 
World  3.3 3.6 2.8 3.2 2.0 2.2 
 
                                                 
10 But of course with an endogenous allocation between sectors.   10
Table 7 : Baseline Scenario: GHG Emissions 
(in MMTCE) 
Country/Region CO2 CH4 N 20 PFCs  SF6 HFC-23  Other 
HFCs 
  2010 2020 2010 2020 2010 2020  2010 2020 2010 2020  2010  2020 2010 2020
France  117  135 14 14 19 19 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 4
EU11  828  903 73 71 73 73 3 2 2 2 0 0 25 29
USA  1802  2115 183 180 122 128 3 3 5 5  2  0 45 75
Japan  350  393 7 6 8 8 1 1 2 2  1  0 13 15
Former  Soviet  Union  758 880 209 224 47 59 3 2 1 1  0  0 4 6
Energy  Exp.  Count.  576 788 127 151 43 55 1 1 1 1  1  1 8 13
Rest  of  the  World  3799 4997 1260 1506 769 915 12 9 7 8  18  19 52 104
World  8231  10212 1872 2153 1082 1258 23 18 17 17  23  20 149 245
 
II.2. The Kyoto Commitments 
We compute the Kyoto commitments on the basis of the GHG emissions, taking into 
account sinks allocated in Marrakech. Concerning the US, we adjust to the Bush Plan aiming at a 
decrease of GHG intensity of 18% during the 10 years 2002 to2012. 
Concerning years 2010 to 2020, as most other modeling teams, we conform to the Kyoto 
forever assumption of stability of emissions in Annex B countries (including US) and no 
constraint or commitment for non Annex B countries. 
 













2010 in % 
 
France 142 154 1 0% 143  -7% 
EU11 840 1003 3 -8% 776  -23% 
USA 2111*  -5% 
Japan 207 382 13 -6% 302  -21% 
Former Soviet Union  1298 1022 19 0% 1318  29% 
** 1995 for fluorinated gases 
*target consistent with Bush Plan for the year 2012 
III. Kyoto scenarios 
Two runs have been performed. In the first one (labeled CO2 case) Annex B countries tax 
only CO2 emission resulting from fossil fuel combustion, but the results as presented incorporate 
all GHG emissions. In the second one (labeled multi-gas case) the tax is applied to all GHG 
emissions. In the two scenarios we do not take into account any flexibility mechanisms (CDM, JI, 
and ET). 
III.1. Carbon tax 
The following table shows the carbon tax in the two cases. When all GHG emissions are 
taxed, as it could be easily expected, the level of the tax is smaller than in the other case in all 
regions. The difference is bigger in Europe than in Japan (the US being a specific case). There is   11
very little gain in Japan from abatement of CH4 and N2O emissions because the potential of 
abatement is smaller. 
Table 9 : Carbon tax in US 2000$ 
Country/ Region  2010  2020 
 CO2  case Multi-gas 
Case 
CO2 case Multi-gas 
Case 
France 187 86 546 328 
EU11 405 271 634 454 
USA 19 6 86 53 
Japan 220 209 391 376 
III.2. Welfare Cost 
The potential of low-cost abatement of other non CO2 emissions, mainly in European 
countries, contributes to reduce the decrease of the welfare cost of implementing the Kyoto 
Protocol, in Annex B countries but also in non Annex B, mainly energy Exporting Countries (and 
FSU which can be assimilated to a non-Annex B region in this type of scenario). 
Effectively, in the multi-gas strategy, there is a smaller decrease of fossil fuel consumption 
and then of the price of energy in international markets. Concerning France and the US, there is 
even in 2010 a welfare gain accruing from the favorable change in the terms of trade. 
 



























Graph 3: Welfare cost and components in 2010 (in % of HFC) 
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III.3. Contributions of GHG to total abatement 
In the multi-gas option the contribution of CO2 in total abatement remains predominant for 
Japan and Other European Countries (respectively 86% and 77%), but becomes a minor part for 
France and the US (respectively 48% and 24%). For the non CO2 gases, three gas are dominant in 
the contribution to the abatement : CH4, N20 and HFCs with shares varying across countries. The 
contribution of PFCs and SF6 to the abatement are negligible (less than 1%) due to the small part 
of these gases to the overall greenhouse gases emissions. It must be noted that, in the CO2 case, 
the contribution of non CO2 gases is non negligible, around 5% of CO2 abatement itself in most 
Annex B countries (see section 4 below). Effectively CO2 abatement affects indirectly emissions 
of other non CO2 gases mainly through the decrease of coal production and fossil consumption. 
 

























Even if the contribution of fluorinated gases are small in the total abatement, their decrease 
in percentage are always very important in respect to the others greenhouses gases (see Graph 5). 
This particularly the case of HFCs whose decrease is more than 60% in 2020 showing that for 
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Graph 5: Decrease of GHG in % in the multi-gas case in 2010 in respect to BaU 
(left: 2010; right: 2020) 


























It can be noted that, for methane, three sources represent the vast majority of the abatement: 
emissions linked to solid waste, to the gas sector and to coal extraction. But this characteristic 
must be connected to the fact that for some sources, in particular linked to the agricultural sector, 
marginal abatement curves are not yet available, this limitation certainly affects the analysis. 
 






















The same phenomenon can be found for nitrous oxide with emissions coming from Nitric 
Acid and Adipic Acid production, and to a lesser extent fossil fuel combustion, represent the 
main contributors to Nitrous Oxide Abatement.   14


















IV. Analytical scenarios 
A clear comparison of multi-gas strategies between countries is difficult within the Kyoto 
Protocol because it considers fairly different levels of abatement in percentage for the Annex B 
countries and, concerning the US, the Bush plan for US taken into account in the previous 
scenarios represents a very small percentage of abatement for the year 2010. In order to perform a 
more accurate comparison between countries we have simulated the two scenarios (CO2 case and 
multi-gas case) with four same levels of abatement in 2020: 20%, 30%, 40% and 50%. 
IV.1. Welfare Cost 
The graph 8 shows the welfare cost by country/region for the two extreme scenarios (20% 
and 50%) As expected, the relative gain of a multi-gas strategy compared to the CO2 case 
decreases with the level of abatement. 
 
Graph 8: Surplus in % percentage of Household Final Consumption in 2020 



























In terms of Deadweight Loss of Taxation, which represents the domestic part of the welfare 
cost, the same observation holds. Graph 9 below which presents the ratio of DWLs between the 
CO2 and the multi-gas cases shows that a sharp decrease with the level of abatement, particularly 
in European countries (France and EU11).   15
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IVI.2. Contributions of GHG to total abatement 
The contribution of carbon dioxide to total abatement is similar among countries in the two 
scenarios as it appears in the graph 8. In the CO2 case, Carbon dioxide obviously brings the main 
contribution, over 95%. In the multi-gas strategy this share grows with the level of abatement, 
more significantly in European countries than in the US and Japan. This confirms that, for low 
levels of overall abatement, the priority is to abate non CO2 greenhouse gases in reason of their 
relatively low cost but that their potential is limited because they represent a small share of total 
emissions, in particular in the US and Japan. 
 
Graph 9: Shares of CO2 in Total Emissions Abatement in 2020 with respect to different levels of 
abatement 

































The relative shares non CO2 greenhouse gases vary across countries and according to the 
level of global abatement, as represented in the graph 10 below. Of course CH4, N2O and HFC 
are the main contributors to global abatement, but important differences exist between countries 
in reason of the relative shares of emission in the initial situation. In this respect the two extremes 
are Japan, with a relatively low share of methane and in the contrary a relatively high share of 
HFCs, and France with a relatively small share of HFCs and a relatively high share of N2O.   16
Graph 10: Contribution of non CO2 gas to their abatement in %, 2020, multi-gas scenario 





























Abating all sources of GHG emissions and not the single carbon dioxide may only reduce 
the welfare cost of committing to a given global target of abatement. What clearly show the 
various scenario assessments presented in the paper is that the welfare gain is possibly important, 
of course bigger in countries where the non CO2 are proportionally higher in the initial situation 
than in other, but that the long run potential is limited. It is not possible to expect a very large 
contribution from them with high targets of global abatement. 
The analysis has been conducted with the assumption that the same carbon price is levied 
on all GHGs. As it is well known, and in reason of various pre-existing distortions in the 
economy and in the fiscal system, the marginal cost of abatement may differ, sometimes very 
substantially, from the carbon price (see in particular Bernard, 1999 and Bernard & Vielle, 2003). 
Optimizing the domestic abatement policy in each country (and also across countries) requires 
equalization of marginal costs, not of levies. How this may affect the results, and in particular the 
relative shares of the various GHGs is an important topic which will be soon addressed through 
the model GEMINI-E3, particular well-suited for this type of assessment.   17
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